This study examines auditor-client relationships following the high-profile merger of a local Chinese audit firm, Da-Hua CPAs, with a Big 4 firm, Ernst & Young, to create EYDH in early 2002. Of the 46 domestically listed clients Da-Hua had at the time of the merger, 30 switched to other audit firms during 2002-04. This large loss of clients could be attributed either anecdotally to a lack of post-merger managerial and cultural congruence, or to a lack of demand for high quality audits. We examine 11 ͑13͒ switching clients in 2002 ͑2004͒ as early ͑late͒ switchers. Although our archival analyses suggest that the switching decisions of early switchers are more likely to be explained by common factors such as changes in client structural characteristics, post-merger client portfolio management, and client-auditor friction over accounting treatments, late switchers do not differ from late non-switchers in terms of these factors. However, we find some time-serial evidence that late switchers follow their audit partners to a local audit firm mainly for greater discretion over financial reporting. Further, semi-structured focused interviews reveal that late switchers found it difficult to adapt to EYDH's practices which, in their view, were less cooperative and too risk aversive. Overall, the results of our case study are consistent with the notion that clients switch from Big 4 to local firms mainly for more lenient audit treatments.
Although a variety of previously documented explanations for client-auditor realignment may account for the departure of these clients, the large loss of listed clients led to the EYDH merger being widely viewed as unsuccessful ͑Feicao 2005͒. While the post-merger switches from EYDH may reflect a "flight from audit quality" ͑DeFond et al. 2000͒ , anecdotal evidence suggests an alternative explanation emphasizing a lack of post-merger managerial and cultural congruence ͑e.g., Chen 2005; Oriental Outlook Weekly 2005͒. Nevertheless, the question of why so many clients left EYDH is an empirical one. Insight into this issue will help improve our understanding of the potential differences between Big 4 and local Chinese audit firms ͑Chow et al. 2006͒ , the role of Big 4 firms in emerging markets ͑e.g., Simunic 2003; Choi and Wong 2007͒ , and the likely consequences of Big 4 expansion into such markets ͑Healy and Lys 1986; Kirsch et al. 2000͒ .
In this case study, we first conduct archival analyses to assess whether the interpretations of client-auditor realignment documented in the literature ͑e.g., Whisenant 2003; Johnstone and Bedard 2004͒ can be used to explain the departure of clients. The factors examined include client structural changes, the audit firm's post-merger client portfolio management practices, client incentives to save on audit fees, client-auditor friction over accounting treatments, and clients switching to follow an audit partner. Although the clients that switched from EYDH in 2002 ͑the "early switchers"͒ were systematically different from those who did not switch ͑the "early nonswitchers"͒ in terms of size, asset growth, future financing activities, profitability, and audit adjustment to pre-audit earnings, there is no evidence that clients which switched from EYDH in 2004 ͑the "late switchers"͒ were significantly different from those that remained with the firm in 2004 ͑the "late non-switchers"͒ based on any of these measures. We also find no evidence to support audit fee savings as a major incentive for client-auditor realignment for either early or late switchers. However, we do find some evidence of partner-following behavior among clients as a plausible interpretation for late switchers. Specifically, we find that late switchers suffered from increasingly unfavorable audit adjustment after the EYDH merger, and were treated more favorably after they switched to a new local firm along with former audit partners.
We also adopt a focused interview methodology ͑Merton et al. 1990; Booth and Booth 1994͒ to obtain additional insights into the underlying reasons for post-merger switching decisions. The interview results indicate that there was a general concern about friction between the Big 4 firm and local clients over what accounting practices are acceptable in China. Although clients demanded more discretion in financial reporting through the use of widespread accounting practices in gray areas, the Big 4 firm found it difficult to endorse financial reports that reflect such practices. The interview results also suggest that several former DH audit partners took their clients with them to a big local firm not only because they felt alienated by the corporate culture in EYDH, but also because they found it increasingly difficult to meet the newly merged firm's quality control standards.
Our evidence suggests that this merger between a local Chinese firm and a Big 4 firm induced considerable structural changes in the acquired firm, with knock-on effects on the local firm's clientele and personnel. Audit partners who are less adaptable to post-merger changes have the capacity to trigger potential client concerns about friction with a Big 4 firm and to translate these concerns into an actual client-auditor realignment decision. Our evidence does not support the popular anecdotal conjecture that the large loss of listed clients was primarily attributable to a failure to establish managerial and cultural congruency in the newly merged firm. Rather, the evidence is more consistent with the flight of some listed clients from high-quality audits in China ͑DeFond et al. 2000͒ . 1 The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. The second section reviews the literature and presents the study's framework, background, and research question. The third section presents the empirical analyses based on archival data. The fourth section presents the focused interview results. The fifth section concludes the paper.
RESEARCH BACKGROUND AND QUESTION
Previous studies have explored the effects of mergers involving Big N accounting firms in the U.S. audit market, focusing mostly on relatively macro-level issues such as auditor concentration ͑Wootton et al. 1994; General Accounting Office ͓GAO͔ 2003͒ and market efficiency ͑Ivancevich and Zardkoohi 2000 ; Sullivan 2002͒ . Some studies have provided international evidence about the impact of audit firm mergers on the audit market ͑e.g., Choi and Zéghal 1999; Baskerville and Hay 2006͒ , focusing on the audit pricing aspects of markets in which auditor service fees are publicly disclosed ͑e.g., Iyer and Iyer 1996; Ferguson and Stokes 2002; Firth and Lau 2004; Lee 2005͒. Healy and Lys ͑1986͒ directly examine the reaction of non-Big 8 audit firm clients to mergers of their auditors with Big 8 firms and specific client-auditor realignment considerations following such mergers. Our paper extends this line of research by exploring plausible interpretations of the large number of auditor changes that took place following EY's merger with DH, a local Chinese audit firm.
Conceptual Framework
Based on prior studies, Figure 1 illustrates a conceptual framework that integrates phases of organizational change following a merger between a Big 4 firm and a local firm.
The Post-Merger Congruence Phase
The literature has documented significant differences between Big 4 and local Chinese audit firms in areas such as client portfolio and the structure of the audit process ͑e.g., Chow et al. 2006͒ . Therefore, an organizational congruence ͑fitting͒ process follows the merger of a Big 4 auditor with a local Chinese audit firm, which involves adjusting the extant client portfolio and pricing policy, introducing the Big 4's audit approaches and quality controls, rearranging managerial affairs ͑e.g., repositioning personnel at various levels and resetting compensation schemes͒, and cultivating a new cultural and ethical climate.
The Fitness Assessment Phase
The congruence process affects both the clientele and the personnel of the local audit firm. A broad body of literature on auditor realignment ͑e.g., Johnson and Lys 1990; Whisenant 2003; Johnstone and Bedard 2004͒ 2 documents that clients assess their fitness for the post-merger audit 1 Though not a focus of this study, we do observe that the EYDH consistently increased its total revenue in the second, third, and fourth post-merger years, suggesting that it was better compensated in the long term by providing the comprehensive and high-quality audits needed by other clients. Further discussion of this point is provided in the fourth section. 2 Whisenant ͑2003͒ summarizes a number of major motivating factors identified in prior studies that surround auditor realignment decisions, which have implications for our analysis of a Big 4 local firm merger.
firm by considering their own structural characteristics, incentives to save on audit fees, tolerance for potential friction over accounting and auditing practices, and the post-merger firm's policy regarding client portfolio management. Other studies ͑see Chow et al. ͓2002͔ for a review͒ suggest that audit firm personnel also assess their fitness for the post-merger firm based on economic, vocational, and cultural considerations. Conceptually, two groupings ͑more fitting versus less fitting͒ emerge among both audit firm clientele and audit firm personnel in the course of this fitness assessment phase.
The Switching Decision Phase
Unsurprisingly, prior findings show that more fitting clients ͑e.g., Johnson and Lys 1990͒ and audit firm personnel ͑e.g., Chow et al. 2002͒ have a greater propensity to remain with the firm, while those that are less fitting have a greater propensity to switch. In normal cases, less fitting clients and less fitting audit firm personnel switch to other audit firms independently of one another, but a less fitting client can voluntarily follow a less fitting audit partner ͑or team͒ to a new firm. For example, Whisenant ͑2003͒ documents such partner-following behavior, 3 but comments that the literature lacks information on the motivation behind it. We later present a possible interpretation of this behavior in an audit firm merger setting.
Factors that May Cause a Lack of Fit and Subsequent Audit Firm Switch

Client Structural Characteristics and Changes
Auditor selection is generally an economic decision: clients purchase audit services from the supplier with the lowest cost at a selected audit quality level, and change auditors in response to changes in the amount or type of services required ͑DeAngelo 1981; Johnson and Lys 1990͒. b. Referred to as partner-following (or joint-switch) behavior in this study.
FIGURE 1 Flow of Phases Following a Big 4-Local Firm Merger
Firms that have developed specializations or reputations are able to render services to particular market segments that are difficult for other firms to enter. However, when a smaller audit firm merges with a Big 4 firm, the clients of the smaller firm face a choice between retaining the newly formed firm, which is likely to be larger and more reputable after the merger, and switching to another small firm that is similar to their incumbent auditor in terms of size and reputation. Large and rapidly growing clients and clients that anticipate issuing long-term debt or equity are expected to have incentives to retain the Big 4 firm, because its reputation and comprehensive services are potentially more valuable to them ͑Healy and Lys 1986͒. Clients without these needs may find themselves paying higher fees for services that are misaligned with their needs if they retain their incumbent auditor after the merger. Another common structural change that is likely to induce client-auditor realignment is a change in the client's controlling shareholders and management team ͑e.g., Burton and Roberts 1967͒. The new controlling shareholders and the incoming management team may have different auditor preferences or simply use the auditors with whom they have worked in the past.
From an agency cost perspective, auditing serves as a monitoring device to reduce ownermanager and intra-owner conflicts of interest ͑Watts 1977; DeAngelo 1981; Chow 1982͒. Agency costs vary across clients and over time for a given client. The literature has documented that agency conflicts can also induce auditor changes ͑e.g., DeFond 1992͒. High ownership concentration is a feature of listed companies in emerging markets, and controlling shareholder expropriation of minority shareholders has been recognized as a predominant source of agency conflict ͑Claessens and Fan 2002; Fan and Wong 2005͒ . Therefore, while the merger of a local Chinese audit firm with a Big 4 firm may satisfy the demands of some clients for stronger monitoring, it may be perceived as less desirable by clients that prefer less monitoring and more discretion in financial reporting.
Auditor Structural Changes and Client Portfolio Management
Client-auditor realignment can also be caused by structural change within an audit firm. Shu ͑2000͒ provides evidence that auditor resignation is positively related to the occurrence of clientele mismatch. Johnstone and Bedard ͑2004͒ find that an audit firm tends to shed riskier clients in its continuance decisions and accept only less risky clients in its acceptance decisions. In an audit firm merger, as the newly formed firm adopts the higher risk control standards of the Big 4 firm, the client portfolio of the previous non-Big 4 firm will be scrutinized, and those clients that are considered too risky will be dropped to avoid the legal liability.
Audit Fee Saving
Prior studies ͑Francis 1984; Gul 1999; among others͒ have documented the audit fee premium earned by Big N auditors. When a local firm merges with a Big 4 firm, an increase in audit fees is anticipated because of expected improvements in the new firm's reputation and quality of service. This increase can discourage clients from retaining the incumbent auditor if they do not value the services provided by a Big 4 firm. However, it is not clear whether these clients will switch auditors if audit fees increase only gradually ͑Firth and Lau 2004͒ or remain largely unchanged after the merger. If cost saving is the primary concern, clients have no obvious incentive to switch auditors after a merger unless audit fees are increased substantially, because they can now purchase more reputable services of presumably higher quality at a relatively low price.
Client-Auditor Friction over Accounting Treatments
Client-auditor friction over accounting treatments can arise from disagreements and subsequent audit adjustments that are aimed at thwarting a client's intended earnings management or modified audit opinions ͑MAOs͒. Sources of client-auditor friction, such as accounting disagreements ͑Smith and Nichols 1982͒ or MAOs ͑Chen et al. 2000͒, are costly because they are associated with significantly negative market reactions. Prior studies ͑e.g., Chow and Rice 1982; DeAngelo 1982; Lennox 2000͒ have documented that client-auditor friction is likely to induce auditor changes. DeFond et al. ͑2000͒ also suggest that auditor conservatism leads to a reduced market share in China.
When a local firm merges with a Big 4 firm, the clients of the local firm have to face auditors who apply Big 4 standards. DeAngelo ͑1981͒ presents the theoretical argument that auditor size is a reasonable proxy for quality differences among auditors, and empirical evidence suggests that Big N auditors are more likely to be associated with client-auditor disagreements over accounting treatments ͑DeFond and Jiambalvo 1993͒, a lower level of earnings management ͑Becker et al. 1998; Francis et al. 1999͒ , and a higher frequency of MAOs ͑Francis and Krishnan 1999͒. Therefore, in our setting, clients who anticipate more friction with their auditors should have a stronger incentive to depart the newly merged firm.
Audit Firm Personnel Lack of Fit and Client Partner-Following Behavior
As noted above, some local audit firm personnel may perceive that they do not fit the new firm resulting from their employer's merger with a Big 4 firm. For example, the post-merger firm will often have more stringent quality control policies and procedures, and will be stricter with potentially problematic clients. Such changes can considerably reduce the degree of flexibility an individual auditor has in conducting audits and negotiating with clients. Shafer ͑2008͒ shows that individual auditors employed by local Chinese firms judge questionable actions as more ethical than those employed by internationally affiliated Chinese firms.
Chow et al. ͑2002͒ provide evidence that less fitting auditors have a greater propensity to leave the firm. These audit partners and their team members may persuade clients with whom they are familiar to follow them, which may strengthen the partners' positions in the new audit firm. Less fitting clients ͑particularly those more concerned about specific accounting and auditing preferences͒ are more likely to be persuaded to follow such auditors. Moreover, the common costs associated with audit firm changes ͑such as search and start-up costs͒ will be minimized by following former partners to a new firm ͑Blouin et al. Chen et al. 2009͒ .
Case Background and Research Question
DH, established by the Shanghai University of Finance and Economics in 1985, was one of the oldest CPA firms in Shanghai. Sponsored by the only university in Shanghai that provided accounting programs at the Bachelor, Master, and Ph.D. levels until the 1980s, DH enjoyed a powerful alumni network that brought it many important clients. In 1999, the firm was disaffiliated with the university to become a limited liability corporation, a move required by the Chinese government as part of its efforts to enhance audit firm independence ͑Yang et al. Gul et al. 2009͒ . Despite its incorporation, DH's internal structure followed a partnership arrangement, and seven senior auditors were ranked as partners.
DH began its lengthy negotiations with EY soon after its reorganization in 1999, reaching an agreement to form a joint firm at the end of 2001. The newly established firm was registered with the Chinese government in February 2002. At the time of the merger, DH had 46 domestically listed clients. This abnormal loss of clients raised questions about the underlying reasons for client-auditor realignment. The late switchers are of particular interest to us because they survived EYDH's initial post-merger client portfolio management and should have been regarded as posing an acceptable level of risk in 2002. Based on the literature and the background to this case, our analyses will focus on early and late switchers, mainly because the former were more likely to have been associated with the client portfolio management decisions of the newly formed EYDH, whereas the latter were more likely to have been influenced by other factors. 4 Including clients who switched in 2003, the second post-merger year, in either the early or late switcher groups, would unnecessarily complicate the interpretation of our results because they could have been influenced by factors affecting either early or late switchers. In summary, this study attempts to address the following research question:
RQ: Why did so many listed clients leave the local audit firm ͑DH͒ after its merger with the Big 4 firm ͑EY͒, particularly when they had survived EYDH's initial post-merger client portfolio scrutiny?
EMPIRICAL ANALYSES OF ARCHIVAL DATA Preliminary Observations
A summary of the structural and financial profiles of the 30 clients that switched from EYDH from 2002 to 2004 is provided in Appendix A. Apart from two clients that switched to PricewaterhouseCoopers ͑PwC͒ in 2002 and 2003, all of the others switched to local audit firms. We hand-collected the available voluntary corporate disclosure on the reasons for these switches from EYDH. Of the 30 clients that switched, eight offered reasons ͑two of the clients that switched in 2002 and six that switched in 2004; see the notes to Appendix A͒. Most of the reasons seem to be consistent with the explanations documented in prior studies. For example, four clients mentioned business development demands or controlling shareholder changes, which is consistent with the client structural changes explanation.
However, these voluntarily disclosed reasons were not generally explained in a clear and specific manner. Thus, it is possible that they may not have been the real drivers of the clientauditor realignments that occurred. Moreover, many other switching clients did not offer any explanation. Therefore, more rigorous and systematic empirical analyses were needed to explore each of the possible explanations discussed in the previous section.
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Client Structural Characteristics and Changes
As Healy and Lys ͑1986͒ argue that client characteristics such as firm size, growth rate, and financing needs are important factors in auditor realignment, we compare these variables for switchers and non-switchers. The descriptive statistics given in Table 2 show that early switchers were smaller, more slow-growing companies with relatively fewer financing activities ͑as evidenced by statistically significant differences in SIZE t , Post-switch Growth, and Post-switch ∆Debt͒. This is consistent with Healy and Lys' ͑1986͒ findings that in the year immediately following an audit firm merger, a client's structural characteristics and changes in those characteristics are likely to be associated with client-auditor realignment. However, we find no signifi-cant differences between late switchers and non-switchers in terms of size, post-switch growth, or post-switch financing activities, which suggests that a client's structural changes do not explain client-auditor realignments in the third post-merger year.
We find that only three clients underwent changes in controlling owners in the year before the auditor switch ͑see Appendix A͒. Moreover, there is no significant difference between early switchers and non-switchers in terms of the turnover rate for the chairperson of the board of directors or the CEO ͑in the pre-switch or switching year͒, and neither are there significant differences between late switchers and non-switchers in terms of these measures ͑untabulated͒. 
*, ** Represent the 0.10 and 0.05 significance levels ͑two-tailed͒, respectively.
t stands for the year preceding the switch event ͑for a switcher͒ or a matched year ͑for a non-switcher͒. For early switchers and non-switchers, t ϭ 2001. For late switchers and non-switchers, t ϭ 2003.
Variable Definitions: SIZE t ϭ the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets in year t. *, **, *** Represent the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels ͑two-tailed͒, respectively.
Variable Definitions: ROA ϭ net income for the pre-switch year/total assets at the end of the pre-switch year; SWITCHER ϭ 1 for a switcher, 0 for a non-switcher;
LTA ϭ natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the pre-switch year; and LEV ϭ total liabilities to total assets ratio at the end of the pre-switch year.
The variables that proxy for the agency conflict or governance structure argument do not differ statistically between switchers and non-switchers in either the pre-switch or switching year.
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Auditor Structural Changes and Client Portfolio Management Clients that receive a modified audit opinion or report a loss are commonly viewed as risky.
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The profile of the switching clients ͑Appendix A͒ reveals that five out of the 30 switchers reported a loss or received a modified audit opinion prior to the switch. Of the four clients that received modified opinions before the switch, three were early switchers. All of the late switchers received clean audit opinions and reported positive audited net income both before and after the switch, which suggests that auditor switches in the third post-merger year could not be readily attributed to EYDH's client portfolio adjustment to reduce risk. We also examine a continuous performance variable, ROA ͑net income for the pre-switch year/total assets at the end of the pre-switch year͒, to evaluate whether the switchers were less profitable than non-switchers. The univariate statistics presented in Panel A of Table 3 show that both the mean and median values of ROA were significantly lower for early switchers than for early non-switchers, which is consistent with a client-auditor re-matching and portfolio management explanation ͑Shu 2000; Johnstone and Bedard 2004͒. However, the statistics do not indicate a significant difference in ROA between late switchers and late non-switchers. After controlling for the effect of pre-switch client size and leverage, Panel B of Table 3 shows that the average ROA was significantly lower for early switchers, but not for late switchers. Therefore, although early switchers were less profitable and probably less desirable for EYDH to retain, the client portfolio adjustment argument in terms of client profitability does not provide a clear explanation for late switchers.
Audit Fee Saving
In the EYDH merger, a few antecedents or consequences could have been consistent with an auditor switch induced by an incentive to reduce audit fees: ͑1͒ a switcher was charged more than a non-switcher during its stay with DH or EYDH and therefore chose to leave for another auditor; ͑2͒ a successor auditor offered a switcher a substantial audit fee reduction, probably during the realignment negotiations; or ͑3͒ a non-switcher experienced a large increase in audit fees by remaining with EYDH, which may prompt a switcher to anticipate an imminent fee increase. Evidence supporting any of these scenarios would suggest that savings on audit fees may have been an important incentive for the auditor switches observed in our sample.
The CSRC has required that audit fee data for Chinese listed companies be publicly disclosed since the 2001 annual report season. To assess the audit fee changes associated with client-auditor realignment, we examine the audit fees of both switching and non-switching clients for the two years before and after the switching event, except for the early switchers and non-switchers that 6 We use two measures to proxy for intra-owner conflict: the Herfindahl Index ͑computed as the sum of the squares of the share percentages owned by the top ten shareholders͒ and the ratio of the controlling shareholding divided by the second top shareholding. We have also examined commonly used governance variables, such as whether a client had established an audit committee, the percentage of independent directors, and the size of the board of directors, but there are no significant differences in any of them. 7 The China Securities Regulatory Commission ͑CSRC͒ regularly lists the names of companies that receive MAOs or report losses in its Chinese Auditing Market Statistics publications. The percentage of these clients of the total number is also given for each CPA firm to reflect the quality of its clients ͑CSRC 2001a had audit fee data for only one pre-event year ͑2001͒. We require a client to have remained with the same audit firm for the two pre-or post-event years; otherwise, we only use the data for the year that was closest to the event. We do not find any decrease in the audit fees paid by late switchers when they changed to a local audit firm. The univariate tests do not show any significant difference in the change in audit fees around the merger event for either switchers or non-switchers.
Multivariate Analysis
Audit fees are determined by factors such as client size, complexity, and engagement risks ͑Simunic 1980͒. We employ the following OLS models to control for these factors and arrive at a more reliable assessment of audit fee changes across different periods.
Model ͑1͒ tests whether a switching client was charged more than a non-switching client during its stay with DH or EYDH. The switchers in the pre-switch years were compared with the non-switchers in the same years within both the early and late switcher groups. The experimental variable SWITCHER was set to 1 for switchers and to 0 for non-switchers. Based on the literature on audit fees ͑Simunic 1980; Craswell and Francis 1999͒ and taking into consideration features of the Chinese audit market and the relatively small size of our sample, we included proxies for ͑1͒ client size ͑LTA ϭ the natural logarithm of total assets͒; ͑2͒ complexity ͑SQSUBS ϭ the square root of the number of consolidated subsidiaries͒; ͑3͒ profitability ͑ROA ϭ the net income to total assets ratio͒; ͑4͒ audit risks ͑RECV ϭ the accounts receivable and other receivables to total assets ratio͒; and ͑5͒ industry membership to control for basic industry differences ͑MANUF ϭ 1 for clients in a manufacturing industry, and 0 otherwise͒. Auditing a manufacturing entity is also associated with a heavier audit workload and more complex audit procedures. A mean t-test shows that the audit fees paid by early switchers to DH were marginally lower than those paid by non-switchers. This is not surprising, given that early switchers were significantly smaller than non-switchers ͑Table 2͒. 10 A few other variables ͑e.g., leverage, inventory ratio, and audit opinion and loss dummies͒ commonly used in the audit pricing literature were also considered when constructing the model. Leverage ͑LEV ϭ the total liabilities to total assets ratio͒ is highly and positively ͑negatively͒ correlated with LTA ͑ROA͒ in the subsamples, causing concern for multicollinearity. Similarly, the inventory to total assets ratio is highly and positively correlated with MANUF. Audit opinion and loss dummies are not included in the model because there are too few observations with modified opinions or reported losses. Including these variables in the model does not qualitatively change the results of the variables of interest. *, **, *** Represent the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels ͑two-tailed͒, respectively.
All reported t-statistics are heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation-covariance adjusted ͑Newey and West 1987͒. "Pre" denotes pre-switch years for switchers ͑or the matching years for non-switchers͒. "Post" denotes post-switch years for switchers ͑or the matching years for non-switchers͒.
Variable Definitions: LAF ϭ natural logarithm of annual audit fee ͑in RMB10,000͒; SWITCHER ϭ 1 for a switcher, 0 for a non-switcher;
POST ϭ 1 for an observation falling in two post-switch years for switchers ͑or two matching years for non-switchers͒; 0 for an observation falling in pre-switch years for switchers ͑or the matching years for non-switchers͒; LTA ϭ natural logarithm of clients' total assets; SQSUBS ϭ square root of the number of consolidated subsidiaries at the year end;
ROA ϭ net income/total assets; RECV ϭ receivables/total assets; and MANUF ϭ 1 for companies classified by the CSRC as a manufacturing firm; 0 otherwise. Model ͑2͒ tests whether switchers realized a significant decrease in audit fees after switching to another audit firm when a switchers-only subsample is used, and tests whether non-switchers experienced a significant increase in audit fees when a non-switchers-only subsample is used. Both of these subsamples cover the pre-and post-switch periods. The experimental variable POST is set to 1 for switching ͑or non-switching͒ observations in the post-switch period ͑or the matching period͒, and to 0 for those in the pre-switch period ͑or the matching period͒.
Panel B of Table 4 presents the regression results of the audit fee models. All six regressions have a significant model F-statistic ͑p Ͻ 0.01͒. The adjusted R 2 ranges from 44 to 64 percent, which indicates that our models have good explanatory power.
11 Consistent with the findings of prior audit pricing studies, both client size and audit complexity have major effects on audit fees in our subsamples, as indicated by the significantly positive coefficients on LTA, SQSUBS, and MANUF in six, five, and four of the six regressions, respectively. The results for the profitability ratio ͑ROA͒ are mixed.
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The results of Model ͑1͒ reveal no significantly positive coefficients on SWITCHER in either the early switchers and non-switchers sample ͑n ϭ 44͒, or late switchers and non-switchers sample ͑n ϭ 63͒. Rather, the coefficient on SWITCHER for the late switchers and non-switchers sample is negative ͑p ϭ 0.152͒. Hence, there is no evidence that switchers were charged higher audit fees than non-switchers by either DH or EYDH.
The results of Model ͑2͒ show that none of the coefficients on POST are significant at conventional levels for either the switchers-only or non-switchers-only subsamples. Hence, there is neither evidence that switchers realized a significant decrease in audit fees by switching to another audit firm, nor evidence that non-switchers experienced a significant increase in audit fees by retaining EYDH. Overall, the univariate and multivariate results do not indicate that audit fee savings considerations acted as a primary incentive for the departure of either early or late switchers from EYDH.
Client-Auditor Friction over Accounting Treatments
As only a few MAOs were issued or negative earnings reported, friction between late switchers and EYDH is not an apparent reason for switches. However, client-auditor friction may arise during the financial reporting and auditing process when auditors require their clients to adjust their pre-audit accounting numbers. For example, a client can avoid receiving a modified audit opinion by making the adjustment suggested by its auditor, even though the earnings figures reported may be less desirable to management or controlling shareholders. Although audit adjustment data are usually not observable, we obtained a proprietary data set from the Chinese Institute of Certified Public Accountants ͑CICPA͒.
13 Given the well-documented strong incentives for Chinese listed companies to overstate their earnings ͑Chen et al. 2001; Chen and Yuan 2004; Haw et al. 2005͒ , the audit adjustment to pre-audit earnings can reflect the extent to which an auditor curbs its client's attempts to manage earnings. Specifically, according to a research report compiled by the CICPA using this data set ͑CICPA 2007͒, CPA firms on average made a 10 percent 11 None of the independent variables has a variance inflation factor ͑VIF͒ of greater than 3, which suggests that multicollinearity does not pose a serious threat. 12 In most cases, the coefficient on ROA is not significant. The only significantly positive coefficient for early nonswitchers is consistent with the notion of price discrimination by auditors. Hay et al. ͑2006, 170͒ also report that results for the profitability ratio are mixed in prior audit fee studies. 13 The CICPA has required audit firms of public companies to report to it both pre-audit and post-audit earnings ͑total profits͒ for each of their listed clients since the 2001 annual audit. We are grateful to the CICPA for granting us special permission to use this data set. Efforts were made by CICPA staff to verify these data with CPA firms to ensure their reliability.
downward ͑net of positive and negative͒ adjustment to pre-audit total profits during the 2001-2005 period. Therefore, we used audit adjustment as a proxy for client-auditor friction over accounting treatments. The audit adjustment variable is set as AUDADJ ϭ ͑post-audit total profits Ϫ pre-audit total profits͒/total post-audit assets.
Comparing AUDADJ between switchers and non-switchers for the year prior to the switch, Panel A of Table 5 shows that early switchers were subject to an average ͑median͒ Ϫ0.0452 ͑Ϫ0.0054͒ audit adjustment in 2001, whereas early non-switchers experienced an average ͑me-dian͒ 0.0044 ͑Ϫ0.0006͒ audit adjustment during the same period. Tests of the mean and median differences indicate that early switchers were subject to more income-decreasing audit adjustment at a marginal significance level ͑p ϭ 0.101 and 0.057, respectively͒. This evidence suggests that early switchers left EYDH in anticipation of stricter audit standards to be imposed ͑and thus more client-auditor friction͒.
As shown in Panel A of Table 5 , late switchers were subject to a mean ͑median͒ Ϫ0.0029 ͑Ϫ0.0029͒ audit adjustment in 2003, whereas late non-switchers experienced a mean ͑median͒ Ϫ0.0003 ͑Ϫ0.0014͒ audit adjustment in the same year. We do not find any significant differences in audit adjustment between late switchers and late non-switchers. This comparison does not suggest that client-auditor friction was a strong inducement for clients to leave EYDH in the third post-merger year.
Panel B of Table 5 reports multivariate analyses controlling for client size, financial leverage, performance ͑prior-year net income to total assets͒, 14 and a typical account ͑receivables͒. These control variables have been documented in the literature on the incidence and detection of misstatements ͑see Eilifsen and Messier 2000 for a review͒. The regression results indicate a significantly negative coefficient on SWITCHER ͑p Ͻ 0.05͒ for the early switcher and non-switcher group, which suggests that early switchers are subject to more downward audit adjustment than are early non-switchers. However, the regression results for the late switcher and non-switcher group show that the coefficient on SWITCHER is not significantly different from zero, which suggests that there is no significant difference in audit adjustment between late switchers and late non-switchers. As for the control variables, the coefficients on LTA are significantly positive for both the early and late switcher and non-switcher groups, which suggests that larger clients experience less downward audit adjustment. This is consistent with prior findings that less frequent and smaller misstatements are typically observed for larger firms ͑Eilifsen and Messier 2000, 34͒. The regression results for the early ͑late͒ switcher and non-switcher group also indicate a significantly negative ͑positive͒ coefficient on LEV ͑PREROA͒, which suggests that clients with higher leverage ͑or lower performance͒ are susceptible to more downward audit adjustment. We do not find a significant association between the magnitude of audit adjustment and the relative size of receivables.
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Partner-Following Behavior
Given anecdotal evidence that a few audit partners left EYDH for Shanghai LXCJ due to a lack of managerial and cultural fit ͑Oriental Outlook Weekly 2005 ; Feicao 2005; Chen 2005͒ , and the fact that 12 of the 13 late switchers changed to Shanghai LXCJ, partner-following behavior may explain nearly all of the post-merger audit firm changes that occurred in 2004. We expect that while these late switchers may have been treated favorably by former partners prior to the EYDH *, **, *** Represent the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 significance levels ͑two-tailed͒, respectively.
# The audit adjustment data for one of the 11 early switchers is not available from the proprietary dataset.
Variable Definitions: AUDADJ ϭ ͑post-audit total profits Ϫ pre-audit total profits͒/total assets; SWITCHER ϭ 1 for a switcher, 0 for a non-switcher;
LTA ϭ natural logarithm of total assets at the end of the pre-switch year; LEV ϭ total liabilities to total assets ratio at the end of the pre-switch year; PREROA ϭ prior-year net income to total assets ratio; and RECV ϭ receivables/total assets. merger, they were not so treated after the merger until they followed the former partners to a new audit firm. Although there is no strong evidence to support the client-auditor friction argument when comparing audit adjustment ͑for the pre-switch year͒ between late switchers and late nonswitchers, the switching clients could have used the pre-merger level of friction ͑rather than the level of friction suffered by the matching-period non-switchers͒ as a benchmark to evaluate their relationships with the auditor. If they perceived an increasing level of friction, they would have an incentive to leave.
To examine this possibility, we further analyze the audit adjustment data by focusing on 12 late switchers that switched to Shanghai LXCJ with their audit partners in 2004. 16 In doing so, we are able to control for differences in the professional judgment and independence levels of auditors, because throughout the sample period, these clients were audited by the same audit teams at both firms. Therefore, the major identifiable factor to affect variations in the average audit adjustment over time is likely to have been the identity of the audit firm. The observations under investigation can be categorized into three phases: ͑1͒ the pre-merger period ͑2001͒; ͑2͒ the post-merger, pre-switch period ͑2002 and 2003͒; and ͑3͒ the post-switch period ͑2004͒. Panel A of Table 6 summarizes and graphs the results of comparing the annual mean and median AUDADJ of 12 late switchers over the 2001-2004 period. On average, in the pre-merger year ͑2001͒, audit adjustment increased pre-audit earnings by 0.6 percent of total assets. This average dropped to a negative figure after the audit teams joined EYDH in 2002. It further decreased to close to Ϫ0.4 percent of total assets in 2003 ͑significant with a p-value of 0.082͒. However, after these audit teams switched to Shanghai LXCJ along with their clients in 2004, audit adjustment became significantly more positive ͑p ϭ 0.078 and 0.038 in the mean and median tests, respectively͒ and returned to or even exceeded their pre-merger levels. Panel A indicates that EY membership considerably restricted the ability of audit teams to grant more financial reporting discretion to their clients.
Panel B of Table 6 gives the results of multivariate analyses controlling for factors such as those shown in Panel B of Table 5 . Two experimental variables, PREMERG ͑coded 1 for observations in the pre-merger period, i.e., 2001͒ and POSTSWITCH ͑coded 1 for the post-switch period, i.e., 2004͒ are set, with observations in the post-merger, pre-switch period ͑2002 and 2003͒ used as the benchmark. The results indicate that both PREMERG and POSTSWITCH are significantly positive ͑p Ͻ 0.10͒, which suggests that late switchers experienced a lower degree of conservatism from either DH or from Shanghai LXCJ than they did from EYDH. The need for financial reporting discretion most likely motivated late switchers and their audit partners to depart EYDH for a non-Big 4 firm, where they received more lenient audit treatment.
Early switchers switched to other audit firms immediately following the merger, leaving no post-merger observations for empirical testing. The mean ͑median͒ AUDADJ in the first postswitch year for early switchers is Ϫ0.0131 ͑Ϫ0.0020͒, which is not significantly different from the mean ͑median͒ value of Ϫ0.0452 ͑Ϫ0.0054͒ in the immediate pre-switch year. Untabulated multivariate analysis ͑similar to that in Panel B of Table 6͒ shows that the coefficient of POSTSWITCH, though positive, is insignificant ͑p ϭ 0.70͒. Therefore, even though early switchers had an incentive to depart DH ͑as shown in Table 5͒ , they did not obtain significantly more favorable treatment from the new firm that was not affiliated with former DH partners. 16 Only one of the 13 late switchers changed to a local audit firm other than Shanghai LXCJ, and it was excluded from this subsample to simplify the comparison. The audit reports of the other 12 late switchers were signed by the same audit partners both when they were clients of EYDH and after they switched to Shanghai LXCJ. Other variables are defined as in Table 5 .
FURTHER ANALYSIS USING FOCUSED INTERVIEWS
Given that the archival evidence does not support most common interpretations for late switchers, and that the evidence for partner-following behavior was largely indirect ͑i.e., based on audit outcomes, without direct observation or confirmation of such behavior͒, we conducted focused interviews to obtain additional insights into the underlying reasons for post-merger clientauditor realignment decisions. This methodology also had the potential to give us a contextual knowledge of the post-merger congruence process at a level of detail not usually available via archival analysis.
Methodology and Interview Design
The focused interview technique is used to collect qualitative data by setting up a situation ͑the interview͒ that allows respondents the time and scope to talk about their opinions on a particular subject ͑Merton et al. 1990; Booth and Booth 1994͒. To maintain a balance between internal validity and contextual understanding ͑Maxwell 2005͒, we adopted a semi-structured approach in which the interview topic guide ͑Appendix B͒ was predetermined but the interviewers were given sufficient flexibility to ask questions that were relevant to the particular setting.
The following steps were followed in the interview process. First, we carried out a survey to identify those companies that practicing CPAs and corporate executives deemed to be clients worth retaining. Selected auditors ͑from EYDH and other local firms͒ and two corporate managers were asked to identify, from all switching clients, those that EYDH should have had an incentive to retain. Six of the switchers were identified as worthy of retention through this process. 17 We then conducted a series of semi-structured, focused interviews with these six clients to understand why they had switched from EYDH to other auditors. Realizing that the switchers could exhibit bias against EYDH in providing their answers, we also interviewed one client that had retained EYDH to understand whether the switchers' concerns were shared by those who had remained. All of the chief financial officers ͑CFOs͒ or chief accountants and a vice president from each of these seven companies were interviewed. Each interview lasted approximately 30-40 minutes. We later held discussions with EYDH auditors to verify the validity of our interpretation of the findings collected from these interviews.
Interview Results
The interviewees all agreed that EYDH focused more on risk assessment, whereas local firms paid more attention to transaction details. While they were impressed by the comprehensive and rigorous quality control procedures employed by EYDH, they appreciated local firms' understanding of the emerging and unique nature of the business environment and business practices in China. However, our interviewees were divided when they were asked to compare the audit quality of EYDH and the local firms. Although the Big 4 firm was less likely to compromise on disputes over accounting treatments, local auditors were more likely to detect misstated transactions. In other words, the Big 4 auditor and the local auditor had strengths in different areas.
A Major Concern about Client-Auditor Friction
Our interviews revealed that there was a fundamental concern about conflicts between EYDH and its local clients in terms of their economic incentives for financial reporting. Such a concern 17 All of these clients were late switchers, with the following A-share stock codes: 600072, 600278, 600591, 600607, 600631, and 600832. We do not find any significant mean or median differences in LTA, LEV, ROA, or AUDADJ for 2003 between the six interviewed late switchers and the 19 late non-switchers, although the seven late switchers not interviewed were smaller than the 19 late non-switchers ͑p Ͻ 0.10͒.
may be attributable to the specific institutional settings in China. Most listed companies have been converted from traditional state-owned enterprises, which once carried the heavy burdens of redundant employees, low-quality assets, and heavy debt. The government and regulators expected them to gradually rid themselves of these problems. Although government backing could prevent these companies from going into bankruptcy, they also need to rely from time to time on government subsidies and accounting earnings to meet regulatory profitability requirements or solve acute liquidity problems, which makes an accommodating auditor important. Furthermore, as China's emerging market is under the control of a strong and powerful government, the implementation of regulations is often heavily influenced by the interpretations of the officials in charge.
Outcomes may differ by official or be inconsistent over time. Although this environment is a common feature of local government and is understood by local auditors, Big 4 firms usually consider it to be unacceptable based on their worldwide experience and risk assessment criteria. For example, whereas listed firms and local auditors commonly use government documents as guidelines in resolving issues in the gray areas of accounting standards, Big 4 auditors do not accept them as legally binding. Indeed, the clients who left EYDH complained that it lacked flexibility in terms of allowing them a degree of discretion over financial reporting, which undermined their reported profits or net assets. Examples include provisions for bad debt and inventory impairment ͑five interviewees͒, estimated pension liabilities ͑three interviewees͒, reversal of asset impairment ͑two interviewees͒, and revenue recognition ͑two interviewees͒. In one case, a client had a disagreement with the auditor over estimating post-retirement benefit costs. Some of the relevant client's employees had been laid off and compensated in full in accordance with local government guidelines. The company believed that no future liability would accrue, as the relevant government documents clearly stipulated that laid-off employees were not entitled to any future benefits. However, the Big 4 auditor disagreed by asserting that government documents were not laws and that they might be subject to future amendment. In dealing with this and other issues, the accounting practices suggested by the Big 4 auditor often led to reduced risk in the long run and lower reported profits for the current period, while making the Big 4 firm unpopular among local clients who believe that their profits were underreported and their liabilities overstated.
Interestingly, one client had no direct experience of the Big 4 at the time of the auditor switch. 18 The managers of the company made their auditor switch decision mainly because friends told them that Big 4 auditors were unreasonable and uncooperative. "Everyone was telling me that Big 4 auditors were mechanical and difficult to deal with," one of the interviewees told us, "They told me sooner or later I would have problems with them ͓the Big 4͔. I then thought the best solution for me may be to stay away from them from the beginning."
Other Potential Concerns about Client-Auditor Friction
The interviewed clients also expressed several other concerns about sources of friction with a Big 4 firm. First, the risk-based auditing approach adopted by the Big 4 is often accompanied by a skeptical attitude toward a client's accounting records, which is usually difficult for the client to accept. In a relationship-based culture such as China's, clients often feel insulted when they sense that they are not trusted.
19 18 As the company had insisted that the same audit team be maintained after the merger, the client did not have direct contact with anyone from EY. 19 Even in a developed market, Behn et al. ͑1997͒ provide questionnaire evidence that auditor skepticism is significantly and negatively associated with client satisfaction.
Second, there is an obvious conflict between a Big 4 auditor and a client when the former emphasizes risk avoidance and the latter wants to maximize the benefits of hiring an external auditor. Clients in China tend to believe that auditors are hired to help them reduce their risk, not to avoid the auditors' own risk. "They were talking about risk all the time," one CFO explained to us, "and soon I realized that the risk they were talking about was the audit risk that they were trying to avoid, not the business risk that we were trying to reduce. Probably they forgot that they are paid to help us reduce our risk" ͑emphasis by interviewee͒. For this reason, Big 4 firms were regarded by many of these CFOs as too self-centered and not considerate of their clients.
Third, whereas local firms have the same team working throughout an entire audit engagement, Big 4 firms often rotate their specialized audit teams among clients. Those who have audited the inventory cycle, for example, may be replaced by another team that is responsible for receivables and payables. Chinese clients generally do not like to deal with multiple-task teams, especially when the same basic questions are asked repeatedly by different people from the same audit firm. This phenomenon, according to the CFOs we interviewed, is not unusual among Big 4 audit teams. Moreover, a few managers complained that they were training less experienced audit personnel for EYDH, rather than receiving the level of value-added services they expected to be forthcoming with the higher audit fees they were paying.
Although concerns over the practices of the Big 4 auditor may not have been the primary reason for local client switches, the reactions of our interviewees tend to suggest that they find it much easier to work with local firms. In this regard, Chinese companies are not prepared to "connect with international practices" ͑a slogan adopted by the Chinese government during the reform of its accounting system͒.
Concerns of a Non-Switching Client
When we discussed these comments with the executives of a company that had continued its relationship with EYDH, we were told that they shared the same concerns and had encountered similar problems. They had retained the auditor after the merger because of their plans to raise equity finance in overseas markets. Part of a fast-growing company determined to pursue worldwide success, the executives believed that the short-term pain resulting from a Big 4 auditor's greater level of scrutiny would be beneficial in the long run. This interview result is consistent with Healy and Lys' ͑1986͒ comment that clients with financing needs are more likely to employ a post-merger Big 8 auditor that has more reputation capital.
Comments from EYDH Auditors
The EYDH auditors provided quite different perspectives during our follow-up discussions, which were aimed at verifying the results of our interviews with switching clients. Although EYDH lost some clients after the merger, its key partners and employees argued that the firm's total revenue had since increased. We find corroborating evidence by examining EYDH's total revenue data later collected from the CICPA. After an 11.7 percent decrease in total revenue in the first post-merger year ͑2002͒ relative to the prior year, the second ͑2003͒, third ͑2004͒, and fourth ͑2005͒ post-merger years saw annual increases of 6.6 percent, 4.5 percent, and 81.2 percent, respectively. 20 In other words, the fees lost through the departure of clients had been more than compensated for by a focus on certain market sectors ͑e.g., multinational clients͒ and new engagements ͑including clients with overseas financing plans͒. It is not surprising that interviewees from both EYDH and switching clients told us that at the time of these switches, EYDH did not make extra efforts to retain the departing clients. The continued increase in its total revenue indicates that the post-merger Big 4 auditor benefited by creating synergies with EY and focusing on clients who needed its more comprehensive and high-quality services. This finding is inconsistent with the alleged post-merger managerial and cultural congruence failure story.
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A more specific reason mentioned by the EYDH interviewees for the loss of clients is related to the turnover in key ex-DH audit partners ͑and their team members͒ after the merger. We were told that as the newly formed EYDH adopted the management style and corporate culture of EY, some of DH's local partners and senior managers voluntarily resigned during 2002 and 2004. This may have been because they perceived or actually experienced greater costs in adapting to a Big 4 firm in the form of reduced flexibility in decision-making over issues such as client retention criteria, audit fee levels, and audit opinions. They also persuaded their clients to join Shanghai LXCJ, a rapidly growing local firm, with them. This interview-based explanation confirms the indirect evidence for partner-following behavior obtained via our archival analysis.
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Summary of Interview Evidence
The tenor of our interview responses suggests that the post-merger EYDH implemented higher auditing standards, which most likely aroused client concerns about friction with the auditor. Nonetheless, it is worth noting that all of the previously discussed forms of client-auditor friction, including accounting disagreements, professional skepticism, concentration on audit risk minimization, and audit team rotations, are not inconsistent with international auditing standards and well-established professional practices. 23 The EYDH interviewees also offered a specific reason for the large loss of listed clients: the departure of less fitting audit partners led to many clients following them to a new firm.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We examine changes in DH's audit client portfolio after it merged with a Big 4 firm ͑EY͒ in early 2002 and find that although the newly formed EYDH shed riskier clients in the first postmerger year, a large number of more desirable clients also voluntarily switched to non-Big 4 auditors in the third post-merger year. Although this phenomenon cannot be readily explained by most of the factors identified in the extant literature, our archival analyses, together with supplementary interviews with clients and auditors, suggest that the fundamental concerns of clients about friction with a Big 4 firm over acceptable accounting practices and reporting objectives are likely to be the primary reason for many Chinese companies staying away from the Big 4. A few former EYDH partners who found it difficult to adapt to the post-merger firm moved to another large local firm. This personnel switching was an important trigger that translated client concerns over friction with EYDH into realignment decisions. The results of our case study provide little support for the popular anecdote that EYDH lost many listed clients primarily due to a lack of post-merger managerial and cultural congruence.
Our study contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, it extends the audit firm merger and expansion literature ͑e.g., Healy and Lys 1986; Kirsch et al. 2000͒ and echoes Chow 21 As market conditions in China have developed to a remarkable extent recently, our finding is likely to suggest that the Chinese accounting market has featured a more balanced demand for quality audits, which supplements our understanding of the "flight from audit quality" phenomenon documented in earlier studies ͑e.g., DeFond et al. 2000͒. 22 Baskerville and Hay ͑2006͒ note that a post-merger audit firm may want to achieve income maximization at the partner rather than the firm level, thus dropping some partners. However, we learned through our interviews that the partners who left in 2004 had their positions secured by the merger agreement between EY and DH. 23 Note that clients may have had incentives to justify their auditor switch decisions by accusing EYDH of causing these problems.
et al. ͑2006, 20͒ by utilizing multiple methods and types of data, along with a wide range of contextual factors, to gain an understanding of the auditing issues surrounding a Big 4 merger with a local audit firm in China. Second, the study supplements the auditor change literature with archival and interview evidence of the rationales for client switching to follow an audit partner ͑in an audit firm merger setting͒. Whisenant ͑2003͒ has documented the existence of such behavior and conjectured that the relationship between the client and the engagement partner in partner-following cases is usually stronger than that between the client and the audit firm. Seabright et al. ͑1992͒ also expressed the concern that if auditor-client attachments are partly sustained by the social qualities of interpersonal ties, considerations such as audit quality may be given less weight. Our archival evidence on the time-series trend in audit adjustment is consistent with the concerns about individual-level audit quality expressed by Seabright et al. ͑1992͒ . Further studies are warranted to examine whether our case-based results are observable in both a larger sample and a broader setting.
Third, the role of Big 4 auditors in countries with differing levels of legal enforcement and investor protection has been the focus of recent auditing research ͑Khurana and Raman 2004; Choi and Wong 2007; Choi et al. 2008; Francis and Wang 2008͒ . Concerns have been raised that Big 4 firm audits may not be of higher quality in all contexts ͑e.g., when the risk of litigation is low͒ and there has been some discussion of whether there is audit quality differentiation in countries in which the Big 4 are not major players ͑Simunic 2003͒. However, the findings are mixed and inconclusive ͑Choi and Wong 2007; Francis and Wang 2008͒ . Our study provides evidence that is more consistent with the stronger governance role played by Big 4 auditors than non-Big 4 auditors ͑Choi and Wong 2007͒. In particular, our interviews with executives of late switchers reveal that these managers regard external auditors as hired agents who serve their needs, such as helping them to reduce operating risks. This view differs substantially from the common perception in developed markets, where external auditors are expected to monitor managers on behalf of shareholders and other external users of financial statements. The fact that these interviewed executives openly expressed their misconception of the primary function of external auditors indicates that this may be a widespread phenomenon. In addition, audit adjustment data show that EYDH was able to curb managers' earnings management by applying more conservative financial reporting standards, and that departing clients were able to report more aggressive financial information after switching to a local audit firm. These findings suggest that audit quality may differ systematically between Big 4 and non-Big 4 auditors in China, where the potential for legal liability is relatively low for both auditors and their clients. This last point would provide an interesting area for future research.
This case study is not without its limitations. First, our empirical results are not very powerful due to a small sample size, an inherent feature of case studies ͑Cooper and Morgan 2008, 161͒. Readers must exercise caution in drawing conclusions based on our results. Second, some of the comments presented in this study are the personal observations of those involved in the auditor switches and may be biased. In addition, we cannot rule out an alternative explanation for the switches after the EYDH merger: the switching clients, although they did not experience an audit fee increase, may have left for local auditors in anticipation of such an increase in the near future because their existing fees were clearly below the normal rate charged by Big 4 firms. Successor auditor: All successor auditors are local Chinese audit firms with the exception of PwC ͑PricewaterhouseCoopers͒. Controlling shareholder change before switch ϭ 1 if a client's controlling shareholder changed within one year prior to the auditor switch, and 0 otherwise. Audit opinion: C ϭ clean audit opinions; M ϭ modified opinions. Audited net income: POS ϭ positive audited net income; NEG ϭ negative audited net income.
